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ABSTRACT 
The paper forms a Foucauldian analysis police reforms in Montenegro. Drawing on 
interviews with police officers at all ranks in 2004, undertaken as reform was commencing 
and on interviews undertaken in 2010, after Montenegro’s independence, the paper 
explores the biopolitics of liberalization. The paper aims to demonstrate norms of internal 
security liberalization that operate beyond a legal understanding of state power. It 
illustrates the operation of a rule of police that produces norms conducive to the 
governance of a dynamic market state. It argues that the rule of police subsists within but 
also subverts the rule of law and human rights approach to democratic development.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It goes without saying that the rule of law is a foundational referent in all strategies of 
police reform in post-conflict settings. The assumption that state power can be regulated 
and liberalized through the rule of law enlivens advocates who associate improvements in 
the exercise of sovereign power with adherence to human rights. Claims are made on behalf 
of the rule of law approach that point to its role in economic development, democratization 
and poverty reduction.1 Since the early 1990’s a constellation of international 
organizations, NGO’s, state aid agencies, academe, think-tanks and private interests has 
produced a sizeable body of knowledge gleaned from their experiences in various post-
conflict and post-socialist societies. This paper argues that somewhat blinkered 
assumptions regarding the nature of sovereign power and the transcendental potential of its 
rule of law pervade this body of knowledge and the assemblage of practices that constitute 
it. Encoded within the definition of a rule of law approach is an apolitical attitude to good 
governance that equates law to the objectivity of scientific positivism.2 However in reality, 
the exercise of power within a state is more messy and complex than the rule of law can 
possibly regulate. When applied to the field of police reform, it is hardly radical to suggest 
that a great deal of police activity operates beyond the parameters of the law.3 
Consequently, notwithstanding the propensity for human rights and the rule of law to 
frame liberalization processes, it needs to be recognised that only a fraction of police 
reforms that occur in these settings are based on the enforcement of law.4 It is in fact more 
common for police reform to be motivated by less principled, more contingent socio-
economic considerations that stem from the prerogatives of state and inter-state security. 
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These are prerogatives that have historically had a promiscuous relationship with 
conceptions of justice and the rule of law more generally.  
 
Thus the article introduces an alternative analysis of police reform embedded not in the 
rule of law but on the pragmatics of securing national identity through a process of 
liberalization. The paper examines the early stages of police reform in the Republic of 
Montenegro as an exemplar study of liberalization. It argues that a biopolitical account of 
liberalization provides us with an increased understanding of the institutional reforms that 
mould new police practices under democratizing regimes. The Montenegrin case will 
demonstrate how, through the discourse of liberal rights, police reforms harness a state’s 
national security aims together with its political and economic objectives. In other words, 
the language of freedom and individual rights, it is proposed, are utilised not to emancipate, 
but to gain greater political and economic control over a state’s population. The paper seeks 
to propose, through the Montenegrin case that the rights of the individual appear to be one 
of a number of different and often disparate assumptions, truths and logics taken into 
account when securing a population. So while human rights define a limit to police 
intervention, that limit may be easily transgressed, overtaken by other politico-economic or 
moral ordering imperatives.  
 
Understanding police reform as a function of biopower challenges the hegemonic Kantian 
approach to liberalization proposed by authors such as Risse and Sikkink.5 Their 
socialization theory proposes that human rights operate as universal ethical instruments 
for local socio-economic transformation.6 ‘Enduring human rights changes’ according to 
Risse, therefore go hand in hand with domestic structural changes’.7. Over time these 
parameters become embedded, and as their acceptance spreads through population groups, 
so the governance of human society becomes more ‘civilized’ and more principled. 8 Rights 
and the rule of law, it is argued, promise a more just application of the activities of 
sovereign decision-making from the micro to the macro levels. Contesting this ideal, the 
biopolitical proposition seeks to reveal the power exercised through state security 
imperatives contained within human rights-based theories of juridical transcendence.  
 
Michael Merlingen has convincingly argued that Risse’s theory occludes asymmetrical 
structural power relations between the socialization agency and the subject of socialization. 
His study examines the discourse and practices of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union, arguing that the power being 
exercised by these organizations through socialization is disciplinary and biopolitical. While 
the OSCE’s ‘disciplinary regime monitors, ranks, grades, rewards and penalizes post-
Socialist countries’ it simultaneously; ‘acts upon the institutional context in which political, 
economic and social life unfolds and upon the activities, capacities and relations of the 
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individuals that make up a population’.9 The OSCE, he concludes, is involved in a civilizing 
process which is fuelled by ‘exhaustive knowledge’10 by which post-socialist sites are 
reimagined/reformed as ‘zones of well-regulated liberty’.11 Democratization, Merlingen is 
pointing out, is a process of normalization.12 Human rights and the rule of law, his studies 
suggest, are regulatory agents of a particular conceptualization of freedom that produces 
liberal subjectivity.  
 
As in other former republics of Yugoslavia, police reforms in Montenegro derived from 
encounters between diverse constellations of state agencies, international organizations, 
commercial interests and NGOs, all of which competed and cooperated to define the region 
primarily in terms of its security needs. While these security issues were framed as 
necessary to secure the freedoms associated with human rights, the bulk of reform was 
directed at the rims of Montenegro, installing control mechanisms that decreased the 
probability that instability in the country would affect global security.13 Externally directed 
reform, in other words, enabled the riskiness of Montenegrins to be effectively managed by 
a global security community which had spent a decade gathering statistics on every aspect 
of life in the country. This included inter alia population levels and attributes, resource 
levels, political and economic relations, the levels of crime, legal standards, security 
capabilities, levels of education and so on. This constant monitoring and surveillance of the 
country by the international community is in itself an object lesson in biopolitical policing. 
Ever before Montenegro’s security apparatus became accountable and transparent to its 
citizens, it had to prove itself accountable and transparent to its sponsors. The EU explains 
that its socialization aim in Montenengro and throughout the Balkans is to ‘transform 
societies and stimulate reforms needed to achieve European standards in all areas of life’.14 
Socialization is a security exercise whereby the EU and the OSCE work with the local actors 
to secure the liberalisation of all aspects of Montenegrin life.  
 
In order to further trace a biopolitical rationality at work within Montenegro, the paper 
draws on meetings and personal observations recorded by the author during a series of 
interviews held with police in 2004 and in 2010. The research in 2004 was carried out 
between 27th September and 5th October in nine sites chosen by the Republic of Montenegro 
Ministry of Interior and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as 
being representative of the entire police organization in Montenegro. In-depth interviews 
were conducted at each site with senior police officials and with four to five officers at a 
patrol level.15 The second series of interviews were conducted by the author with employees 
at all levels of the Police Directorate in the Republic of Montenegro between 1st July and 
15th July 2010 at Podgorica, Herceg Novi, Bar, Danilovgrad and Nikšić.16 Having further 
explored how policing contributes to the biopolitical problematic, the paper will contrast the 
responses from police interviewed in 2004 with the responses from 2010.17  
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BIOPOLITICS OF POLICE REFORM  
 
As a frame of analysis, biopolitics is usefully contrastable with geopolitics. Whereas 
geopolitics is concerned with strategies of power over territory, biopolitics is concerned with 
strategies of power that operate on the welfare of a population within that territory. The 
term was developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, whose studies of liberal 
penal reform in the 18th and 19th century revealed experimental techniques of disciplining 
and improving the behaviour of inmates through the deployment of a more strategic 
approach to incarceration. Rather than locking prisoners into cramped, disease ridden cells 
where death was commonplace, reformers argued for a new regime undergirded by a highly 
effective and efficient structure of surveillance which would grant the prisoner freedom to 
move around the prison. Freedom to move it was proposed inculcated individual 
accountability, internalizing the locks of the solitary cell in a system that allowed 
authorities to perpetually monitor the improvement of the prisoner from a distance; ‘morals 
reformed – health preserved – industry invigorated – instruction diffused – public burthens 
lightened’  boasted Bentham who is credited with the original blueprints.18 Adopted for 
hospitals, schools and factories, the Panopticon became a more generalized schematic of 
governance that gradually ‘spread throughout the social body’ to strengthen society, 
‘increase production, develop the economy and raise the level of public morality’.19 The 
major contribution Foucault made through these studies was to show how techniques of 
military discipline liberalized and infiltrated civilian institutions and later became 
embedded throughout society.  This rationality of governance, which he termed biopolitics,  
came to constitute a mode of political power exercised through modern Western societies, 
producing through law, custom, force and ethics to produce calculable, rational, governable 
liberal subjects.20  
 
The schematic of Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault’s argued, ought to be understood as a 
metaphor for the profound epistemological shift in the exercise of sovereign power that 
occurred with the rise of liberal values in the 19th century. As Foucault outlines, the liberal 
state differed from its predecessor in terms of its methods to secure space. The problem of 
sovereignty, he wrote, is ‘no longer of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing 
circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good from the bad, ensuring that 
things are always in movement …but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this 
circulation are cancelled out’. 21 Early radical liberalism conferred on this emergent modern 
subject rights that were irreducible to an economic model premised on the productive power 
of societal and individual freedom.22 Sovereignty had become a managerial rather than a 
patrimonial exercise of power under the cameralists of the 18th century, who saw the state 
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as a machine and the ruler as the foreman for whom rule emanated from committees, 
bureaux, inspectors, statisticians and by other experts.23 As mercantilism gave way to free 
trade the break with the authoritarian decisionism of the Leviathan sovereign ruler who 
ruled down on a passive society was no longer appropriate to a framework of governance 
that required self-governing, responsible, disciplined, and above all, rational rights bearing 
subjects. In Foucault’s lecture series, On the Birth Biopolitics,24 he argues that two 
conceptions of freedom arose from this epistemological break in sovereign rationality: a 
revolutionary juridical definition of freedom where the individual was deemed to be in 
possession of certain freedoms; and a utilitarian definition of freedom which asserted a limit 
on the practices of public authorities over the civil society. These two accounts of freedom, 
Foucault insists, had heterogeneous histories. Nonetheless it was the latter formation which 
persisted to mark out modern freedom, so that governmental utility is used to gauge the 
juridical limitation of public authorities. ‘Since the beginning of the nineteenth century we 
have been living in an age in which the problem of utility increasingly encompasses all the 
traditional problems of law’.25 The important implication arises that sovereignty is not so 
much a question of legitimacy, but of effect, of success.  
 
Contemporary sovereignty therefore serves to administer life as a sort of economic asset 
amidst the turbulence and uncertainty generated by the market based economy. In other 
words, an awareness of biopolitics allows us to contest the idealism of a linear rule of law 
dividing wrong from right. Instead it outlines a complex assemblage of pragmatic 
discretionary powers; a non-linear radically contingent array of interventions and orders 
that are continuously shifting in a grey zone where wrong and right is subject to the 
interpretative capacity of administrative, technical and security experts.26 It is in such 
conditions of liquid modernity27 that the rule of law contends with, supports and is utilised 
by what Walter Benjamin termed the rule of police.28  
 
Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the rationality of governing through the norm of freedom 
required a thorough knowledge of the population of the sort that only a policing agency 
could collate and process.29 Consequently, police power, understood as the activity of data 
gathering and sharing, includes not only the police officer, but, for example, the social 
worker, the psychiatrist and the probation officer. Thus an assemblage of police 
relationships can be found, as Foucault recounts, at the birth of modern police in the 
eighteenth century.30 Importantly, the rise of police power coincides with, indeed 
participates in, the discovery of ‘population’ as an object of statistical survey. Based on the 
assumption that by knowing the essence of things one can improve them so as to maximize 
their potential for economic and political utility, liberalism requires knowledge for ceaseless 
reforming. Biopower is constituted by the capacity to improve minds and bodies by 
tinkering with the institutions and agencies that regulate human behavior.31 Dillon reminds 
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us that a liberal life cannot be guaranteed without a security apparatus which regulates life 
around a terrain of values, demarcated as being the essence of a (good) human.32 
More importantly it must gather this knowledge, from a distance, without disturbing the 
flow of people and things that maintain the health of the economy. As Bell describes it; 
‘biopolitical governance emphasizes indirect forms of rule through state agencies that 
govern “at a distance” through various regulatory protocols’.33 Law enforcement is 
consequently less concerned with upholding timeless, fundamental ideals, than it is with 
the pragmatics of configuring a network of relationships to more effectively know and 
manage the life processes of its population.  
 
Brodeur has referred to this in terms of a policing web 34 – a civilian-military assemblage 
that processes what has described as the ‘production of freedom’.35 As Evans forcefully 
argues, ‘biopolitical regimes of security governance have always revolved around threats to 
existence’.36 If needs be, such a regime ought to withdraw these freedoms until such time 
as the environment is once again safe. The imperative to secure these rights, which form 
the existential undercurrent of a liberal market economy, demands a highly integrated, 
dynamic, networked police apparatus formed around knowledge, planning, surveillance 
and, of course, intervention. That is, it requires a civilian-military assemblage capable of 
generating data on its population, knowing the parameters of its normal behaviour and 
monitoring deviance that constitutes a risk to its mobility. Thus, as Foucault’s work clearly 
demonstrates biopower and policing are coeval products of liberal modernity, producing a 
circulatory power within and beyond the rule of law to administer the norms of productive 
living.37  Accordingly, law enforcement officials can be meaningfully understood as 
‘knowledge workers’.38  
 
In its actual practice, the liberalization of law enforcement – what we nowadays term police 
reform – serves to create this network of knowledge and to produce police forces capable of 
securing the incessant flow of people, things and ideas in a manner conducive to the 
market principle of freedom. For this to occur police must be aware of the techniques and 
technologies used to monitor movement; ensuring its constant flow and knowing when to 
intervene and when to let things flow (laissez-faire). This modus operandi is inherently 
risky. Implicitly biopolitical, it serves a distinctly economic function as it ‘seeks to pre-empt, 
minimize or disrupt loss’.39 It is for this reason that risk management is the cardinal 
element in the apparatus of liberal reform. The behavioural norms at issue in biopower are 
those that constitute identity in terms of risk. A biopolitical analysis is concerned with 
examining how risk normalizes the human and societal body which it seeks to regulate. 
Biopolitics, essentially, utilises a continuum of physical and epistemic violence exerted on 
behalf of securing a distinction between normal and deviant, inside and outside, productive 
and degenerative. One such risk might involve management of alternative cultures or non-
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liberal ways of life within the confines of the state. Montenegro, as we shall see, is an area 
that is widely portrayed as housing familial communities, semi-nomadic people and 
multiple faiths. It is a country where cultural norms are rarely homogenous and 
uncontested. Liberalization, as Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė observed in Macedonia,40 tends 
to problematize as atavistic, illiberal or inefficient the lives and the values of individuals in 
these sub-groups. Justified by a moral and apolitical rationale, security is presented to 
these groups together with new inalienable rights, as a conduit for the improvement of their 
lives.  
 
Consequently, biopower works on the private sphere to secure the functionality of the 
public sphere. A liberal police force gains its most quotidian exceptional power from the 
need to monitor and gather intelligence from the private sphere of individuals so that it can 
filter normal behaviour from suspicious or irrational activity.41 Reform therefore seeks to 
improve surveillance skills at all levels of practice, at the level of human and technological 
relationships while simultaneously demonstrating law enforcement as an ethical, 
progressive and detached service provider. Consequently, police reform is less about the 
rule of law than it is about the rule of normative power, or more accurately, the rule of 
police. Occurring in instances where state controls have become obsolete for various 
reasons, reform seeks to decentralize state power towards a market-based model; and to 
adjust it to the new values and dynamic lifestyles of capitalism. It socializes police to act 
from within society, with consensus, rather than to act in a top-down manner in its primary 
activities; gathering data, processing it, intervening with reasonable force or distributing 
intelligence and information where necessary.42  
 
 
ENCOUNTERING POLICE IN MONTENEGRO 2004.  
Montenegro provides us with an interesting case study to pursue the relationship between 
police and biopower. While accounts of Montenegro’s history are highly contested, it would 
generally appear that the region existed as a political territory since the 15th century. As 
elsewhere in the Balkans, Montenegro has been located in a region constituted by various 
clans or tribes without any overarching sense of nationality.43 It has been proposed that 
clan loyalty and religious beliefs demarcated the territory throughout until the early 
nineteenth century. The modernization of the territory really commenced with the 
constitutional introduction of parliamentary-monarchy in 1905 under the rule of Prince 
Nikola I. Pointing out a plurality of Montenegrin population constructs, one commentator 
argues that clan-based identities persist to this very day and often belie the modern 
constructs of ethnic identity.44 In any event the nationalism that was fostered throughout 
the early twentieth century was challenged by communist ideology during the mid-twentieth 
century and the question of Montenegro as being a place for Montenegrin ‘people’ only 
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emerged again in the 1990’s, during the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Nationalism in 
Montenegro coincided with the end of socialism.45 Calls for a separate Montenegrin 
Orthodox church and a language called Montenegrin (rather than Serbian) were aired as the 
republic attempted to delink itself from former Yugoslavia and merge with the European 
Union.  
 
It should be pointed out that life under Yugoslavia’s market socialism was certainly not 
insulated from biopolitical strategies of rule. Drawing on the same enlightenment concepts 
as did West European liberalism, security in Yugoslavia was built into the euro-socialist 
commitment to ‘self-management’.46 Self-management implied that decisions be devolved 
from the centres of political control in order to ‘wither away the state’. Social self-protection 
- an implication of this self management philosophy – tried to establish the citizens of 
Yugoslavia as the subjects rather than the objects of the security apparatus: that as owners 
of the means of production they also owned the instruments to protect the means of 
production.47 The claim made was a democratic one: police is the ‘servant of the people’, 
neither separated nor opposed to the people.48 This enabled Yugoslav theorists to argue 
that Yugoslav socialism was an entirely different to the sort of state or police socialism 
prevalent in the Soviet Union and its satellite states.49 In fact social self-protection is a 
definitively biopolitical construct. It drew deeply on the discourse of multi-agency and 
partnership approaches to governance (rather than government);  
 
We have come to believe that the focus of the fight against crime should be 
based on social prevention consisting of various social activities, the activities of 
the state, social organs and citizens, to be directed primarily at the detection of 
direct objective and subjective causes of criminal actions and other phenomena 
of social pathology. What we are talking about is the application of various 
social, economic, educational, cultural, health, and other similar measures 
aimed at the removal of direct sources of criminal actions 50  
 
Crime prevention, as practised by the police in Yugoslavia, was a system of social control, it 
was a tool for societal modernization and an instrument of security to manage the riskiness 
of the Cold War. As information gathering was a priority task, emphasis was placed on the 
need for patrol officers to build and maintain contacts with local members of the 
community. Police were ordered to become familiar with the residents of their patrol and 
with the characteristics of the community. Usually returned after training to the community 
in which they grew up, police officers were embedded within civil society – as one agent 
amongst a range of other actors – educational, health and economic – that sought to mould 
the population of Yugoslavia around the values of market socialism.51 The success of this 
experiment is difficult to gauge as the temptation to apply brute sovereign power to hold 
Yugoslavia together undermined the multi-agency, society oriented approach advocated by 
socialist criminologists. Moreover police practices varied greatly throughout the federation. 
Notwithstanding the principles of self-management, the omnipresence of the Communist 
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Party tended to direct police power in Yugoslavia. Ultimately, the rule of law was 
subservient to the maintenance of political order, undermining the Federation’s attempts to 
decentralize policing. As the security of Yugoslavia became ever more precarious, the 
further policing moved from civil society.52   
 
Most of the police I interviewed in the Republic of Montenegro had been hired by the Prime 
Minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanović in the late 1990’s.53 They were recruited as a body 
of national security, as a counter force to the threat posed by the presence during the 
Balkan War of FRY military billeted in Montenegro. From a force of 1200 officers which 
used to police the republic in the 1980’s, Dukanović steadily recruited thousands of men as 
‘police’ to secure the republic.54 Recruitment was done on a first come first hired basis and 
officers were deployed without training – receiving a bare uniform, a nightstick and a gun. 
When the wars ended Montenegro found itself with a rather motley police that was 
militaristic, largely untrained, under resourced and unfamiliar with police operating tactics. 
It was these men who became central players in the government’s quest for independence 
from the Federal Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Never a force of law, the police in 
Montenegro had acquiesced and even profited from the criminalization of the Montengrin 
state. From the time of UN’s international sanctions, right through the Balkan wars and 
afterwards, police was implicated in a nexus of crime, smuggling and corruption that 
pervaded the political and commercial classes of Montenegro.55 The police I interviewed in 
2004, prior to independence and in the earliest stages of internationally directed reforms 
were members of a distrusted institution that enjoyed little legitimacy and no trust. It was a 
police that, beyond its political affiliations, had few human, legal, technical or 
infrastructural resources to call upon.  
 
From the interviews, what emerges primarily is the problem of access to civil society – the 
referent body of biopolitical knowledge, planning and surveillance. NGOs in Montenegro 
formed as a resistance to the illiberal policing methods practiced during the epoch of 
socialism. Consequently viewed as non-compliant with liberal values of freedom, police 
suffered from a lack of the relational power it required to function. It had neither the 
capacity to gather nor to adequately process information. Not only did it have weak links 
with societal actors but it was also detached from other state policing agencies. 
Furthermore, it was weakly connected with itself - police did not have two way radios to 
communicate with one another and surveillance capacities were not developed. Their 
vehicles only had sufficient petrol for a week of driving every month.  
 
Montenegro was policed from nine centres, each managed by a directly appointed official of 
the ruling party. The Ministry was run as a military organization with strict hierarchical 
chains of command and very little discretion afforded to officers. The further from the urban 
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centre I travelled – the closer to the border with Serbia - the more dilapidated, martial and 
physically distant from residential areas became the police stations. The first set of 
interviews was held in run-down police buildings with low paid male police officers wearing 
unkempt uniforms. Many officers, known as ‘contract police’, were entirely uneducated in 
police science and had provided their own uniform. The only evidence they were a police 
officer was to be found in a folded employment letter which they kept in their breast 
pockets. Reform had commenced just prior to the survey and it was as a result of this 
reform that female uniformed officers had been recruited. Though the recruitment and 
promotion of female police would become an important aspect of reform, these early recruits 
were given menial administrative tasks. Heavily made-up and wearing high-heeled shoes, it 
was they were who served coffee during my interviews. Other reforms included the 
establishment of a Border Police and a Police Academy. With the assistance of international 
organizations in-service courses on core training in policing, strategic management and 
community policing were running. Corruption was still commonplace with police check 
points on every major road routinely extracting bribes from passing motorists.56 
 
Speaking to me beneath portraits of the pro-independence Prime Minister, Milo Dukanović, 
it was apparent that the police were entirely immersed in the divisive politics of Montenegro. 
It was not surprising that officers at interview consistently spoke about their inability to 
work with opposition controlled local authorities and about permanent tension with media 
companies sympathetic to the Montenegro’s union with Serbia. I was told in sites such as 
Herceg Novi that the isolation of police meant that police were effectively powerless to even 
enforce traffic regulations. The most common description articulated during these 
interviews was of a completely isolated institution, operating without support from local 
authorities, civil society or NGOs. The two urban centres, the capital Podgorica, and the 
post-industrial city of Nickšić, demonstrated clearly the extent of this isolation. When 
talking about a low level of public confidence in policing, officers said that there were a 
number of factors which fuelled mistrust. One officer spoke about the ‘weaknesses’ of the 
police as an institution and spoke about resource and infrastructural deficiencies 
combining with a ‘political problem inherited from the previous regime when the police were 
a more repressive and political’ institutional organ.  
 
These weaknesses, resource deficiencies and politicization made it difficult to implement 
societal-oriented modes of police work. At Podgorica middle ranking officers explained that 
the way police were used led to the institutions low credibility among the public. An 
example was provided of police being regularly deployed to protect Municipal authorities 
when illegally constructed houses were being demolished in semi-formal refugee sites that 
had developed around the outskirts of the capital. At interview police estimated that nearly 
12,000 internally displaced persons, refugees or Roma were in living in dwellings that had 
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been constructed on state land without building permission. The policy of the Municipality 
was to evict these residents and demolish their dwellings. These homes represent the entire 
wealth of these very poor rural migrants and thus demolition is most often violently 
opposed as it results in destitute families being made homeless. Between January 2004 and 
October 2004 there were 257 such evictions, according to interviewees. As a result, the very 
presence of state agencies in an informal settlement incited strong and often coordinated 
resistance. Police described the use of sentries and sirens among residents who could 
mobilise at the first sight of a police vehicle in the neighborhood. Media organizations that 
were hostile to the police and to the prime minister and his pro-independence stance 
regularly covered these events; ‘In any ten day period you will find over five stories with 
photos in the newspapers about police violence in the destruction of illegally constructed 
homes’. And yet police were not as passive in these events as was portrayed at interview: 
hidden among these newspaper stories is the case of Mr. Besim Osmani, who, having been 
given only a few hours eviction notice, was beaten by plainclothes police officers as 
bulldozers raised his family home.57 The theme of a violent, detached police force acting on 
society also emerged from interviews with police at Cetinje, in central Montenegro. Rank 
and file officers felt particularly alienated from the inhabitants of Cetinje: ‘People here have 
an odd mentality’, it was explained. ‘Everyone is related to one another and violent assaults 
occur spontaneously’. Unable to interact with local civil society to address these policing 
problems, officers spoke of how they relied on surveillance and robust intervention tactics. 
From interviews it was apparent that respondents saw human rights as a challenge to state 
security, rather than as a biopolitical opportunity.  
 
In Nickšić, according to police at interview, the problem of police isolation had a severe 
societal impact. Virtually a border town, Nikšić had developed during the 1990s wars as a 
transit site for smuggling. Drug smugglers using the city’s proximity to Croatia and armed 
with weapons attained during the war in nearby Bosnia used Nikšić as a base for their 
operations. Police spoke about the sudden proliferation of in the supply and abuse of drugs, 
especially heroin, among the youth in the town. According to the commander, ‘historical 
politically motivated antagonism’ largely prevented police from building relationships with 
families and local NGOs concerned by drug use. Asked about police relations with 
community groups, the commander was unable to say if any existed, or if they would be 
willing to support police activities.  
 
Distrustful of local NGOs and religious leaders, wary of journalists and cynical about the 
motives of small business operators, police explained that the solution to their isolation lay 
in education. Society, it was felt, needed to be educated. Examples were provided about the 
attitude of the youth in Podgorica who, although inebriated, resist arrest and ‘insist on 
rights they do not have’. Officers insisted that they understood the need for human rights 
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but that the public, and in particular the media, also needed to be educated so their 
responsibilities were clarified. As an example of a force finding it difficult to police the new 
circulation of ideas and commerce, an older officer opined that young people held anti-
authority attitudes and sought ‘fast easy money’. ‘Everyone’s a lawyer now’ added another 
officer. According to the police I interviewed, the introduction of new legislation,58 which 
prohibited random stop and search activities and curtailed covert surveillance practices, 
made it ever more difficult for them perform their duties in the manner by which they were 
accustomed. Montenegrin society, it appeared from my interviews, had outgrown its 
authoritarian police modus operandi.  
 
The OSCE led the international response to police reform in Montenegro from 2001 
onwards. Alluding to the role of the police as politically ‘hired security guards’, the reforms 
sought to initiate ‘trust, accept and respect’ for the Montenegrin police.59 The 
recommendations published in 2006 by the OSCE outline the rudiments of the matrix of 
reform. Much of the reform was directed at improving the capacity of the police to secure 
the population in a more transparent, accountable and financially efficient manner. A large 
chunk of the reforms were directed at strategic planning and human resources. Human 
rights are barely mentioned but are deemed to be implicit in the ‘normative framework’ 
outlined which introduces strategies based on professional standards, operational 
autonomy, and technical capacity. Rather than human rights it would seem that police 
media relations and police management training were given priority, as were 
recommendations for ‘downsizing’ the force. Correlated to ethical police behavior and the 
need for a police Code of Conduct, rights were presented as but one of a number of 
instruments of reform aimed at better relations with civil society. Ethical behavior, for 
instance, is described in the report in terms of it improving the efficiency and coherency of 
relations between other actors in the security community. Central to the reform vision was 
‘the question of intelligence’, which inculcates a capacity to recognize and manage risk. This 
also compelled police to build relations with other policing agencies;  
 
While the ministry abounds in statistics there are gaps and a lack of strategic 
analysis to maximize available information. First, information gathering has to 
be more complete and cross-sectoral, ie each service cannot jealousy guard its 
information, as occasionally happens at present. There needs to be an 
assurance of good information available, and that it is the right information 
needed, then it has to be put into a central system for operational and strategic 
analysis.60  
 
 
 
REVISITING POLICE IN MONTENEGRO 2010 61 
Having undertaken six years of internationally directed reform, the potential for the 
Montenegrin police to exercise biopolitical power had dramatically increased by the time I 
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returned in 2010. Reforms had targeted the financial and managerial capacity of police 
administration, the ability of the police to address organised crime, border policing, 
community relations, media relations, police training, transparency and issues of legislative 
and political accountability. A complex raft of accountability mechanisms had been 
established and the monitoring role of the prosecution service had been strengthened. 
Internal regulations and new working practices had been adopted to counter corruption, 
bribe taking and unethical behaviour. As an aspect of its financial accountability, the Police 
Directorate was undertaking a scheme of redundancies. Older, less educated but more 
experienced police were being retired early or demoted to lower ranks, while younger better 
educated officers were being promised promotions. This development meant that there was 
less police on the street, less checkpoints on the main arteries and more physical space for 
for each officer to monitor. Reproducing the liberal tension between circulation and control, 
police were had no choice but to adapt techniques to secure space from a distance.  
 
The process of gaining independence affected the context and the form of policing in 
Montenegro. During the six or so years of change, reforms implemented by the Montenegrin 
government tended to be conspicuously associated with national identity. In articulating the 
new liberal values of its independence, the very architecture of police had altered between 
2004 and 2010. Acting as a symbol of modernization, police HQ in Podgorica had been 
rehoused in a brand new building erected behind the old run down Ministry edifice. The 
design was functional and each office was the same size. At interview, the Head of Human 
Resources at the Police Directorate proudly claimed that the building embodied the new 
liberal values aspired to by his organization. As with ‘US security installations’, he half-
apologised, ‘one is no longer permitted to offer visitors food or drink’. I experienced the 
building as generic, clean, smoke-free; radically different from the smoky hospitality of the 
old building. An entire new generation of police managers occupied the building, each with 
good English and a keen diplomatic sense of the politics of reform, which was now 
intimately tied to Montenegro’s aspiration to become a full member of the European Union. 
The portraits of the President that had adorned the walls had been replaced by EU, US and 
Montenegrin flags. Relational power with external agencies was generated from this building 
– where extradition agreements were agreed and international police cooperation (in the 
‘fight against organised crime’) established.  
 
Security was made particularly integral to Montenegro’s political economic trajectory (and 
arguably, its viability as a state), when it was decided that EU accession negotiations would 
start with rating its compliance on Chapters 23 and 24 – judiciary and fundamental rights 
and justice freedom and security. The performance of the police, in fact, covered a number 
of the seven key priorities laid out by the EU under these Chapters. Police reform was 
directly concerned with priorities such as the fight against corruption; the fight against 
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organized crime; media freedom; and cooperation with civil society.62 The rights 
fundamental to most EU reformists were freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
and association. These reforms concerned the relationship police had with the media, with 
the local NGO sector, with IDPs and with the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. 
More pragmatically, the EU keenly monitored Montenegro’s compliance on border security 
arrangements; particularly in the areas of migration, asylum policy, visa policy, drug 
trafficking, human trafficking and customs cooperation.63  
 
The erection and redecoration of police buildings, together with the construction of an 
integrated system of border management, the establishment of a border police and the 
construction of a national forensics laboratory represented the most conspicuous reforms 
undertaken by the Montenegrin police. At interviews the laboratory was described as a 
‘national institution’ and it was emphasized that Montenegro no longer needed to send DNA 
samples for analysis to Serbia. A symbol of the new autonomous identity of the country, it 
was also used at interview to demonstrate a commitment to a scientific approach to crime.64 
This scientific approach was reinforced by the passage of legislation confining police work to 
legal, rights-based, activities and further developed by repeated pedagogical encounters 
with police from the US, the EU and Sweden. These encounters were highly influential. For 
instance, the system in Sweden of prosecution led investigations was adopted. This 
compelled police to rely less on confessions and more on the presentation of physical 
evidence to secure convictions.65 Furthermore a Swedish system of intelligence-led policing 
was additionally adopted. Intelligence-led policing emphasizes policing as the systemic flow 
of information. In other words, the circulation of knowledge occupied the centre of all police 
reform whereby national and international institutions would be able to communicate and 
together police Montenegrin space from their own respective distances. Initially introduced 
in the ‘fight against organized crime’, it is envisaged that intelligence-led policing will; 
 
be a tool for identifying strategic challenges and trends, as well as for producing 
crime threat assessments. Strategic and operational analysis of gathered 
information will also be quite important in areas such as traffic safety or 
community policing. 66 
 
A command and control centre operating from the new Podgorica HQ was developed to 
facilitate the collation and distribution of information. The EU heavily supports intelligence-
led policing and the technologies which support it. At a conference on video surveillance, a 
member of the EU delegation recently underlined the role it plays in protecting property 
rights and ensuring public safety.67 The expectation was that the surveillance and 
intelligence management skills gained in the ‘fight against organised crime’ would be 
transferable to everyday policing.  
 
16 
 
The propensity for police to use powers gained fighting organised crime in more routine 
ways was evident in a number of aspects of reform. It was most evident in the usage of 
Special Investigative Measures. These exceptional measures were introduced so that police 
could gather and utilise information on suspected criminals in the Montenegrin 
underworld. These measures effectively suspend the right to privacy of someone suspected 
of involvement in organised crime to enable covert and other forms of surveillance to be 
used. Symbolic of how rights and exceptional security practices cohabit within 
Montenegro’s reform process, the permitted usage of Special Investigative Measures has 
expanded considerably since its inception in 2009. As a supportive OSCE report, ‘While it 
was previously limited to investigation of organised crime and criminal acts that may bring 
prison sentence of ten or more years, now there is a whole list of criminal acts for 
investigation of which special investigative means can be applied’.68  
 
More mundane intelligence gathering animates community policing. Work undertaken by 
Gajić and Stojanović found that police officers understood community policing 
pragmatically ‘as an effective way to gather intelligence, construct legitimacy and improve 
police access to the general public’.69 Introduced as a function of the lowest ranking officer, 
his or her role is to gather intelligence from parents and children when responding to 
incidents of vandalism or public nuisance. It is important to note that police reform had not 
advanced to the point where members of the IDP or gypsy communities living on the edge of 
urban centres in Montenegro were cooperating with police. At the time of the interviews it 
was evident that the situation of the IDPs, refugees and Roma and gypsy communities had 
not changed since 2004.70 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian refugees living in Montenegro 
remained in a legal limbo in which they have no citizenship.71 In a typical rule of law 
approach to structural problems, the solution for refugees the main problem for refugees in 
Montenegro is perceived to be their lack of legal status.72 The biopolitical analysis taken by 
this paper suggests that formalizing their legal status will not change the way marginalized 
communities will experience the state. A survey undertaken at the time of my interviews 
found that 36 of the 40 Roma surveyed believed that police had a right to inflict violence by 
way of on-the-spot punishment or as a preventative measure.73 While human rights 
legislation may prevent physical violence on marginal communities, epistemic violence 
against non-conforming marginal groups will doubtlessly continue.  
 
One incident, relayed at interview with a senior police commander, demonstrated the 
vulnerable status of Roma when encountering police in Montenegro. The authorities, it was 
explained by the commander, were unhappy with the presence of Roma vehicles in the 
centre of the city, near the Presidential mansion and other state buildings. 74 Consequently 
police cordoned off the centre to these vehicles. The fine for being caught within the zone 
was the confiscation of one’s vehicle. A large number of vehicles were impounded and this 
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had a severe economic impact on the communities involved which lost their source of 
income. The officer in charge of the operation told me that Roma brought down the 
standards of the city centre. Eventually the vehicles were returned after promises of 
compliance with the ban were made by the NGOs on behalf of the affected people. At one 
level this anecdote reminds one of the originary preoccupations of pre-modern policing: 
hygiene and sanitation of circulation. At another level, it is evident that regulations on the 
legality of vehicles were conspiring with security and safety concerns to produce a 
normative decision that negatively affected the freedom of a community to exist.  
 
During the course of the interviews it became evident that many of the characteristics I had 
encountered during my 2004 survey persisted. Redundancy, uncertainty, low pay and the 
military hierarchical command chain meant that morale amongst the officers remained as 
low as it had been six years previously. The operational autonomy of the Police Directorate 
had never materialized because a government appointee had been made the chief of police. 
The Ombudsman had not prosecuted any cases and boasted at interview of his close 
working relationship with the Police Directorate. Other accountability mechanisms were 
dogged by political and legal wrangling. While corruption among rank and file officers 
seemed to have been addressed, accusations of corruption and links to organized crime 
directed at elite political actors persisted. Moreover, reform-led laws that had been passed 
are, at the time of writing, being politically contested or being actively subverted.75 
Indicatively the OSCE reported that, despite the implementation of legislation, most people 
in Montenegro in 2010 did not believe that the police could be held accountable.76 In the 
meantime, the US State Department reported mistreatment and torture of suspects in 
police detention while a Montenegrin NGO was reporting increased levels of politically 
motivated violence by police.77 The ideal liberal police, which can navigate in the confluence 
between security and rights had yet to materialize.   
 
Indicativley, the officers and other employees I interviewed were reluctant to speak about 
human rights and so it is difficult to comment upon their attitudes. The overriding theme at 
all interviews was the sense that reform was a technical process of modernization that 
aimed at compliance with European Union standards, which in turn secured Montenegro’s 
sovereignty. While police officers grumbled at the changes to their work practices caused by 
new legislation and showed enthusiasm for the infrastructural, technological and tactical 
innovations being introduced, they consistently tied human rights together with 
modernization and with accessing the free market space of the European Union. Far from 
being advocates of human rights, police at all ranks spoke about human rights as part of a 
greater political project which was viewed to be distant from the daily grind of police work. 
Embedded within the normative framework, compliance emanated from the establishment 
of accountability structures, their attendance at OSCE training sessions and their new 
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customer friendly approach to community relations. It would be difficult to claim, as Risse 
and Sikkink 78 might, that the officers interviewed were in the midst of a transformational 
process of socialization around the inherent universal ethics of human rights.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
A law enforcement institution that is competent to exercise biopower needs to be one that is 
aware of the utility of the humanitarian values of liberalism. It needs to be open to 
operating amongst an assemblage of policing agencies and civil society actors whose 
relational power is exercised at a distance for the betterment of a population. It requires an 
appreciation of the limits imposed by the rule of law and an understanding of the events 
which render these limits temporarily surmountable. The underlying strategy of liberal 
policing is that the police must not act on a society. It must act from a society. Policing 
needs to embed itself as a norm of that society. Ultimately, liberal internal security reform 
efforts aim for law enforcement officials to merely manage the freedom of a society which 
actively monitors itself. The emphasis on reform in the Balkans throughout the 1990’s was 
on improving police internal and external relations, providing police with more up-do-date 
technology, educating police on the utility of the rule of law to state security imperatives 
and training police management on more cost effective methods of securing freedom. The 
argument in this paper is not to denigrate human rights or the rule of law. It is to suggest 
that the emphasis on the rule of law on police reform to a great extent overestimates its 
regulatory power. Human rights, this paper argues, is one of the many tools reached for by 
police when a specific job is to be accomplished. It is a method of defining limits, building 
legitimacy and trust, demonstrating compliance with international standards of 
professionalism and of gaining greater access to society. It is a part of the process of 
normalizing police-community relations, which in post-conflict regions is a biopolitical 
prerogative.  
 
In a state that is defined in terms of it being a multi-ethnic, multi-faith, politically divided 
entity, such as Montenegro, building a competent police force with a capacity to cooperate 
and share reliable information with international security agencies was accorded the 
highest priority. Democratic policing was constructed around modern national security 
institutions which improved the capacity of the state to gather knowledge, undertaken 
planning, surveillance and intervene when reasonably necessary. Human rights were 
ostensibly embedded in new police discourse and outsourced to various state and non-state 
monitoring agencies established to make police accountable. These agencies have not 
shown that the rule of law which underwrites their power is potent enough to alter the 
deeply embedded national security prerogatives that animate Montenegro’s accession to the 
EU. As a result change has been technical rather than principled, focusing on everyday 
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security in all areas of life rather than on the deepening of a democratic order. It is difficult 
to find evidence that reforms have enhanced the legitimacy of the Montenegrin police 
beyond its traditional support base. They have however made the Montenegrin police a far 
more disciplined and biopolitically competent security force.  
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